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CASENOTE
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.: Multiple
Assessments of Punitive Damages In
Toxic Tort Litigation
David Lafferty
I. Introduction
Punitive damages are awarded against a defendant whose
tortious conduct has been proved to be outrageous.' Unlike
compensatory damages, punitive damages are imposed to
punish the defendant for wrongful conduct and to deter simi-
lar conduct by the defendant and others in the future.2
"Awards for punitive damages have long been the subject of
considerable debate and controversy."' Although their contin-
ued existence is criticized as contributing to the civil liability
crisis, supporters of punitive damages contend that they
often provide the necessary incentive for injured parties to
seek justice.. However, claims for punitive damages in the
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
2. Id. § 908(1) & comment a.
3. An Overview of Punitive Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 650 (Oct. 19, 1988).
4. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REv. 139 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 284 (D.N.J. 1989).
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toxic tort context present courts with additional problems,
since their effects can be devastating.'
Toxic tort defendants, typically facing numerous punitive
damage claims based on a single wrong,7 have begun to raise
constitutional objections to repetitive punitive damage liabil-
ity. In Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,8 the federal district
court for New Jersey held that the imposition of multiple pu-
nitive damages violated the defendants' due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.9 However, the Juzwin court considered itself powerless
to shape an adequate remedy and, therefore, the repetitive as-
sessment of punitive damages was permitted despite the viola-
tion of the defendants' due process rights. 10 This note will re-
view the court's decision, the barriers that prevented the court
from enforcing its conclusion, the court's proposal for legisla-
tive reform, and the decision's significance with regard to
mass toxic tort litigation.
The Leonen court noted that the availability of punitive damages is an incentive to
both the injured plaintiff and the manufacturer defendant. For the plaintiff, punitive
damages often recoup the "skyrocketing" cost of litigation, and thereby encourage
injured parties to sue when compensatory damages for the harm would be offset by
attorney's fees and costs. With respect to manufacturers, the existence of punitive
damages prevents a manufacturer from marketing a dangerous product when a cost-
benefit analysis using compensatory awards only would otherwise permit the product
to be marketed. Id.
6. An Overview of Punitive Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 650 (Oct. 19, 1988).
7. One large asbestos company, Raymark Industries, had 41,000 cases pending
against it as of 1988 stemming from Raymark's production, sale and distribution of
asbestos-containing products. Raytech Corp. Seeks Bankruptcy Protection To Re-
solve Successor Liability Issues, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1,387 (April 5, 1989).
8. 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989)[hereinafter Juzwin II], vacating 705 F. Supp.
1053 (D.N.J. 1989)[hereinafter Juzwin I].
9. Juzwin H, 718 F. Supp. at 1236; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens for the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws .... " [emphasis added].
10. Juzwin 11, 718 F. Supp. at 1236.
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II. Background
A. The Asbestos Problem
Asbestos is a mined fibrous mineral which is resistant to
fire, heat, and corrosion.1 It has been used as an insulation
product in millions of buildings in the United States and in
hundreds of millions of automobiles. 2 As an insulant and fire
retardant, asbestos performed almost flawlessly.' s However,
by the middle of the twentieth century, asbestos industry
leaders became aware of the link between their product and
certain lung diseases, including cancer."' Despite this aware-
ness, top industry executives chose not to warn the public of
these dangers.' 5 One estimate is that since 1941, twenty-one
million workers in the United States have been exposed to
dangerous levels of asbestos.' 6 Latency periods, the time be-
tween exposure to asbestos and manifestation of an asbestos-
related disease,' vary from fifteen to forty years.' 8 By the end
of 1987, more than twenty thousand asbestos-related suits
were pending in federal courts,' and at least that many were
pending in state courts.20 Estimates indicate that there could
be as many as two hundred thousand additional asbestos
claims filed by the year 2015.21
Almost all asbestos plaintiffs seek punitive damages.2 2
11. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM, & M. SHANLEY, VARIA-
TION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES (RAND Institute for Civil
Justice 1984) at 3 [hereinafter ASBESTOS COMPENSATION].
12. Id.
13. T. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 7 (1987).
14. ASBESTOS COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 3.
15. See P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT. THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
ch. 4 (1985). Pretrial discovery during several major asbestos cases in the 1970's pro-
duced documents showing that some asbestos manufacturers knew of the dangers of
exposure to their products at least as early as the 1930's. Id.
16. ASBESTOS COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 9.
17. Selikoff, Asbestos Disease in the United States, Toxic TORTS: TORT ACTIONS
FOR CANCER AND LUNG DISEASE DUE To ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 150 (1977).
18. ASBESTOS COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 3.
19. GAO says Backlog of Cases Growing, 20,000 Claims Pending in Federal
Courts, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 172 (July 6, 1988).
20. ASBESTOS COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 7.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Szuch & Shelley, Time to Eliminate Punitive Damages?, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 28,
1991]
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Plaintiffs in the typical asbestos action base their claim for
punitive damages on the asbestos manufacturer's failure to
disclose to the public known health hazards associated with
its product.2 3 Most courts have held that these repeated fail-
ures to warn, despite spanning several decades, constitute
only one course of conduct.24 Therefore, given the large num-
ber of asbestos suits and the relatively small number of asbes-
tos manufacturers, a plaintiff brings suit for a wrong that has
been the basis of previous litigation against the same defend-
ant. Defendants such as these find themselves subject to mul-
tiple claims for punitive damages for a wrong that is meant to
be fully punished by a single award of punitive damages.
Mandatory class actions would force all claims for punitive
damages to be litigated together, and thereby avoid this di-
lemma; however, these actions are generally unavailable in the
toxic tort context. 25
B. History of the Issue
Judicial concern over the multiple assessment of punitive
damages for a single wrong was first addressed in Roginsky v.
Richardson-MerreU1.2 6 In Roginsky, the manufacturer of the
drug "MER/29," an anti-cholesterol drug which was proven
later to cause cataracts, faced the possibility of hundreds of
punitive damage awards over a period of time.2 7 Lacking pre-
cedent to deny the plaintiff's claim, the court permitted an
1983, at 13, col. 1. See also, An Overview of Punitive Damages in Toxic Tort Litiga-
tion, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 650 (Oct. 19, 1988).
23. E.g. See Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F: Supp. 272, 282 (D.N.J.
1989).
24. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 1986); Cathey
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1021 (1986); In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
But see Campbell v. ACandS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (D. Mont. 1989); Neal
v. Carey Canadian Mines Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377-78 (E.D. Pa. 1982) aff'd sub
nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985).
25. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1006 (3d Cir. 1986); In re
Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab.
Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), vacated,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
26. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. Id. at 834.
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award of punitive damages against the defendant.2 8 However,
the court had "the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims
for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions
throughout the nation [could] be so administered as to avoid
overkill." 9 The court considered the consequences of multiple
punitive damage awards in the mass toxic tort context to be
so serious as to require special scrutiny of the proof needed to
establish the necessary element of recklessness on the part of
the manufacturer.3
In the decade following Roginsky, the concerns expressed
by that court seemed moot, as there were only three cases in
which punitive damages were upheld against the manufactur-
ers of defective products.,1 However, with the implications
surrounding the increase in mass toxic tort litigation,3 2 de-
fendants, facing staggering punitive damage claims, 3 have be-
gun to raise constitutional arguments against the repetitive
assessment of punitive damages for a single wrong.
34
III. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.
A. Facts and the Court's Initial Decision
Steven Juzwin was a sixty-eight-year-old former em-
ployee of the Johns-Manville Corporation who was diagnosed
28. Id. at 839.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 841-42.
31. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 142; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1261 & n.12 (1978). These cases were: Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), and Moore v. Jewell Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d
288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
32. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1986)
(describing the rise of asbestos litigation as "an unparalleled situation in American
tort law").
33. For example, prior to its filing for bankruptcy protection, the A.H. Robins
Co. had paid out over thirteen million dollars in just seven lawsuits stemming from
the Dalkon Shield IUD. The company had an additional 5,000 suits pending against
it, most of which requested punitive damages. In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 Bankr. 555,
557-58 (E.D. Va. 1988).
34. See Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
1991]
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as having asbestos-related ailments. 5 Juzwin and his wife ini-
tiated an action against several companies which had supplied
asbestos products to his former employer.36 Juzwin's com-
plaint contained a punitive damage claim which the defend-
ants moved to strike. The asbestos suppliers argued that the
repetitive assessment of punitive damages for a single wrong
would violate their rights under the "double jeopardy, 387 "ex-
cessive fines,"3 8  and "due process" 9  clauses of the
Constitution.
The defendants first argued that the multiple assessment
of punitive damages violated their right to not "be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb."'40 The court held that the double
jeopardy clause is "limited in application to proceedings
which are criminal in nature," and that "[d]espite the close
analogy between criminal sanctions and punitive damages, pu-
nitive damages are not a criminal sanction.""' The court con-
cluded that multiple punitive damages for a single wrong were
not sufficiently "criminal in nature" to be prohibited by the
double jeopardy clause. 2
The defendants next argued, that if the court permitted
each claimant to sue for punitive damages, the aggregate ef-
fect would violate the eighth amendment's proscription
35. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., No. 87-38764 Civ. (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
36. Asbestos plaintiffs typically do not sue their employers, who are generally
protected from liability by their state workman's compensation laws. ASBESTOS COM-
PENSATION, supra note 11, at 3.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall...
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ......
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
39. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No state
shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. Juzwin I, 705 F. Supp. at 1058.
42. Id. at 1059. The court's holding on this issue was the same as the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In
Halper, the Court held that the "protections of the Double Jeopardy clause are not
triggered by litigation between private parties." 490 U.S. at 451.
[Vol. 8
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against "excessive fines."' 48 The court disposed of this argu-
ment by concluding that the excessive fines clause had no ap-
plication to civil awards." Moreover, the court held that even
if the clause did apply to civil awards, the defendants' motion
was not yet ripe because a factual finding that any of the de-
fendants had been subject to previous liability had not yet
been made."
The court accepted the defendants' final argument. Al-
luding to the "fundamental fairness" requirement of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,4 the court con-
cluded that "multiple awards of punitive damages for a single
course of conduct ... can and do" violate due process.47 Not-
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
44. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1060. The Supreme Court has since endorsed this
holding in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
In Browning-Ferris, the defendant was found liable for tortious interference with
business relations based on predatory pricing in the waste collection business. The
jury returned a verdict of $51,146.00 in compensatory damages and six million dollars
in punitive damages. On certiorari, the defendant argued that the punitive damages'
gross discrepancy to the compensatory award amounted to an "excessive fine" within
the meaning of the eighth amendment. In rejecting defendant's argument, the Su-
preme Court held that the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment does not
apply to punitive damage awards where the government has not prosecuted the case
or cannot share in the recovery. 492 U.S. at 264.
45. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1060.
46. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). In
Lassiter, an imprisoned mother whose parental rights were terminated in an action
brought by a state agency argued that the state's failure to provide her with an attor-
ney during the termination proceeding violated her due process rights. In holding
that Lassiter's due process rights had not been violated, the Court stated that due
process is not a "technical" term, but rather "expresses the requirement of 'funda-
mental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is
lofty." Id.
47. Juzwin I, 705 F. Supp. at 1061.
The United States Supreme Court has since held in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991) that an award of punitive damages, despite being
disproportionately greater that the award of compensatory damages, did not violate
the defendant's due process rights. In this case, a single award of punitive damages
was granted. In Haslip, the Court made it clear that the case was being decided on its
own set of facts, since there could be no "mathematical bright line" between punitive
damage awards that were and were not constitutional. Id. at 1043. By so stating, the
court appeared to imply that there is some point where a defendant will be shielded
from an award or awards of punitive damages. In upholding the award of punitive
damages, the majority emphasized the historical availability of punitive damages at
common law, while at the same time expressing concern about awards of punitive
1991]
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ing the "thousands of asbestos-related claims for compensa-
tory and punitive damages which have been filed throughout
the country against the defendants,"' 8 the court held that the
due process clause limits the number of times a defendant
may be subjected to punitive damages for a single course of
conduct. 9 The court stated that due to the defendants' con-
tinued liability in other courts, the resolution of this issue
could only be achieved through the enactment of national leg-
islation. The court suggested that:
Such legislation must: (1) determine initially whether pu-
nitive damages should be allowed in mass tort cases, and
if so; (2) establish standards for their imposition and for
the amounts to be awarded; (3) determine if maximum
limits should be imposed and whether they should be by
fixed amount or some formula based upon the net worth
of defendant; (4) provide procedures for dealing with suc-
cessive claims; and (5) determine who shall be entitled to
receive and participate in those awards.50
The court concluded that those defendants who could demon-
strate that punitive damages had already been imposed on
them for the identical conduct as alleged in the plaintiffs'
complaint would be relieved of further punitive liability. 1
B. The Rehearing
Before the plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial
of their punitive damage claim to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, they asked for and received a rehearing of the
case by the trial court.52
damages which "run wild." Id. Particular weight was given to the procedural safe-
guards implemented at the state (Alabama) trial court level, including alerting the
jury to "the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same con-
duct. . . ." Id. at 1045 (emphasis supplied).
48. Juzwin I, 705 F. Supp. at 1061.
49. Id. at 1063.
50. Id. at 1065.
51. Id.
52. Id. Although plaintiffs brought their motion for rehearing under FED. R. Civ.
P. 60 (b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect), the court consid-
[Vol. 8
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On rehearing, the court affirmed its belief that multiple
assessments of punitive damages violated the defendants' due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment.53 However,
the court vacated its original order and also permitted the
plaintiffs' punitive damages claim to continue so long as cer-
tain conditions were met." The court held that it would be
unfair to the plaintiffs to implement its decision retroactively,
and that its original ruling would not protect the defendants
in suits filed in other jurisdictions.5 The court then proposed
a four part test which would be used to determine whether a
future plaintiff's claim for punitive damages would be
barred. 6 Under the proposed test, four conditions must be
satisfied:
1. A full and complete hearing must be held, after ade-
quate time has elapsed to investigate and discover the full
scope and consequences of such conduct and during
which all relevant evidence is presented regarding the
conduct of the defendant against whom the claim is
made;
2. Adequate representation is afforded to the plaintiff,
with an opportunity for plaintiffs similarly situated and
their counsel to cooperate and contribute towards the
presentation of the punitive damages claim, including
presentation of the past and probable future conse-
quences of the defendant's wrongful conduct;
3. An appropriate instruction to the jury that their award
will be the one and only award of punitive damages to be
rendered against the company for its wrongful conduct;
4. Such other conditions as will assure a full, fair, and
complete presentation of all the relevant evidence in sup-
port of and in opposition to the claim.57
ered the motion to be more appropriately brought under Rule 12 of the General Rules
of the court (matters the court overlooked), because the previous ruling was not a
final judgment, but interlocutory in nature. Id.
53. Juzwin 11, 718 F. Supp. at 1234.
54. Id. at 1234-5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1235.
57. Id.
1991]
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Having promulgated this test, the court then concluded that
none of the criteria had been satisfied in any of the previous
litigation between the parties. 8 Furthermore, the court felt
powerless to enforce its prior ruling, because the same defend-
ants could still be subject to punitive damage claims in other
jurisdictions. Secondly, the court felt that even for defendants
within the jurisdiction, given the various ways that punitive
damages are calculated around the country, it would be "im-
possible for this court to ensure that the 'one and only' prior
award contemplated the 'full' damage caused by a defendant's
wrongful conduct. '59 The court further acknowledged that a
second award of punitive damages, based on a wrong that was
the subject of an earlier award, would not necessarily violate
due process "if the first award was not intended by the jury to
constitute full punishment for the defendant's wrongful con-
duct."8 0 The court stated that it would be unfair to bar the
Juzwin plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages based on the
conduct of other litigants in other jurisdictions.61 The court
then renewed its previous recommendation that a national law
58. Id.
59. Id. The court gave examples of several jurisdictions that have enacted limits
on punitive damages, which might have the effect of meeting the "previous punitive
damage liability" of the first Juzwin decision without fully punishing a defendant for
his culpable conduct. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitive damages
are limited to an amount equal to actual damages except in certain cases of aggra-
vated conduct); Tax. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.008 (Vernon Supp.
1991) (punitive damages are limited to four times the amount of actual damages or
$200,000, whichever is greater except in cases of malice or intentional torts where
punitive damages are not limited). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (Supp. 1990)
(punitive damages are limited to the amount of defendant's annual gross income or
five million dollars whichever is less, unless the profitability of defendant's miscon-
duct excedes the limitation in which case the limit on punitive damages is an amount
equal to one and one half times the amount of profit which the defendant gained or is
expected to gain as a result of the misconduct); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9, 96 (West
1987)(punitive damages limited to the amount of compensatory unless plaintiff estab-
lishes his or her case by clear and convincing evidence, in which case there is no
dollar limitation for punitives); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1991) (punitive
damages are limited to three times the amount of compensatory damages unless the
plaintiff demonstrates with "clear and convincing" evidence that the amount is not
excessive in light of the facts and circumstances).
60. Juzwin 11, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
61. Id. at 1236.
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be enacted to protect the defendants' due process rights.2
The court stated that only through a uniform national law or
a Supreme Court decision would the outcome of a trial in one
jurisdiction have an effect on a later trial in another
jurisdiction.6
IV. Analysis
The Juzwin court found that the defendants' due process
rights had been violated." Despite the doctrine that a federal
court must provide a remedy for the violation of a constitu-
tionally-protected right,"3 policy and practical considerations
persuaded the court to permit multiple assessments of puni-
tive damages against the defendant.6 6 After considering the
consequences of its earlier ruling, the court concluded that its
decision to bar this and future plaintiffs' punitive damage
claims was not appropriate. 7 The court reached this conclu-
sion after balancing the procedural requirements announced
in its earlier decision against the consequences of their appli-
cation.6s The court stated that the criteria that must be met
in order to bar a punitive damage claim had not been met
and, more importantly, under present law could never be
met.19 Under current law, no federal district court could ever
instruct a jury that their award of punitive damages will be
the only one against a given defendant, because such an order
would not be binding outside the district in which it was
given.1° The court recognized that if such an instruction were
given during a New Jersey trial, judges in other jurisdictions
in which the defendants faced suit could ignore it.71
62. Id.; see Juzwin I, 705 F. Supp. at 1065.
63. Juzwin II, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
64. Id. at 1234.
65. See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 691-92 (1948).
66. Juzwin II, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Jaben v. United States, 333 F.2d 535 (8th Cir.), af'd, 381 U.S. 214
(1964)(the holding in another circuit stating what constitutes a valid complaint was
not binding).
71. Juzwin H, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
1991]
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The court additionally based its decision on the practical
difficulty in determining whether a defendant's previous puni-
tive damage liability was meant to be the "full" punishment
for its wrong. 2 In its earlier order, the court had provided
that if a defendant could prove previous punitive damage lia-
bility in any court, it would be relieved of all further punitive
damage liability for the same course of conduct.7 3 However, to
the court, accepting evidence of previous punitive damage lia-
bility presented two problems. The first problem was in decid-
ing whether the earlier punitive damage award was based on
the full damage caused by the defendant or on damages which
pertained only to the named plaintiff in that suit. " The sec-
ond problem was in determining whether the previous puni-
tive damages were awarded by the same standard used in New
Jersey.75 Recognizing the practical difficulty in accepting evi-
dence of previous punitive damage liability, the court ruled as
a matter of policy that it should not be considered."
The court also considered the fairness to the plaintiffs of
excluding their punitive damage claim, based on the conduct
of litigants in earlier trials.77 The court thought it unfair to
eliminate from these plaintiffs a right that would still exist for
plaintiffs suing these defendants in other districts. 8
Juzwin is significant because, although it joins a growing
trend of recent decisions that have denied toxic tort defend-
ants relief from multiple assessments of punitive damages,79 it
is the first decision to recognize that such punishment can
amount to a due process violation. Courts, in other jurisdic-
tions deciding the same issue, have based their decisions on
the public policy behind punitive damages and the difficulties
in enforcing the conclusions reached in Juzwin.
72. Id.
73. Juzwin I, 705 F. Supp. at 1065.
74. Juzwin II, 718 F. Supp. at 1235.
75. Id. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
76. Juzwin II, 718 F. Supp. at 1236.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See infra notes 78-117 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
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The court in Man v. Raymark Industries,"° considered
the same due process argument raised in Juzwin and reached
the opposite conclusion.81 In rejecting the defendants' due
process argument, the court held that the "public interest"
could only be served by preserving the availability of punitive
damages to all plaintiffs, not just the first to sue.82 The court
further noted that eliminating all but the first assessment of
punitive damages would restrict the "true deterrent effect of
punitive damages." '
The Man defendants also argued that public policy con-
siderations would be thwarted, because multiple assessments
of punitive damages would deplete the defendants' funds
available to pay compensatory damages to future toxic tort
plaintiffs. 84 The court, however, stated that it would be a
greater harm to permit a defendant to escape punitive damage
liability merely because it has injured a relatively large, as op-
posed to a more limited, number of persons2 5
In Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 6 the Supreme Court of
Kansas rejected several arguments raised by a toxic tort de-
fendant that multiple punitive damages should not be
awarded. The defendant in Tetuan raised the same due pro-
cess argument raised in Juzwin: that multiple punitive dam-
age liability violated the "fundamental fairness" requirement
of the fourteenth amendment.8 7 However, unlike the court in
Juzwin, the Tetuan court did not consider the defendant's
conduct to be a "single" wrong, but rather a series of corpo-
rate actions.8 Therefore, the court was able to avoid a finding
of a due process violation because the defendant was not be-
ing punished repeatedly for a single wrong but for a series of
80. 728 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Haw. 1989). In Man, the plaintiffs sought damages for
injures caused by exposure to the defendants' asbestos-containing products. Id. at
1463.
81. Id. at 1465-68.
82. Id. at 1466.
83. Id. at 1467.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1467-68.
86. 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210 (1987).
87. Id. at 492, 738 P.2d at 1245; Juzwin II, 718 F. Supp. at 1236.
88. Tetuan, 241 Kan. at 492, 738 P.2d at 1245.
1991]
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wrongs.
The Tetuan court also rejected the defendant's policy ar-
gument that the "maximum deterrence was achieved long
ago" from previous punitive damages awarded to previous
plaintiffs." The court held that even if this defendant were
adequately deterred, the deterrent objective of punitive dam-
ages was not just to this defendant, but to others who would
commit like wrongs."'
In Campbell v. ACandS, Inc.,91 the federal district court
for Montana held that punitive damages could be recovered
against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos, notwith-
standing that the defendants faced innumerable lawsuits na-
tionwide.2 The Campbell court did not reach a conclusion as
to the constitutionality of multiple punitive damages, but
rather based its decision on the deterrent objectives that pu-
nitive damages seek to fulfill.93 The court concluded, as did
the Tetuan court, that even if the defendants had been ade-
quately deterred by previous punitive damage assessments,
future claims should not be barred.9 4 The court noted that the
deterrent objective of punitive damages "goes beyond the sim-
ple attempt of deterring these particular defendants from re-
peating the same tortious conduct, but extends to the public
in general." 95 Referring to toxic tort defendants, the court
added that "the desired effect is to deter all ... entities...
from placing the public at risk by engaging in similar
conduct." 96
The court in Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.,97 upheld a
seven million dollar punitive damage award against the manu-
facturer of the intrauterine device "Cu-7," despite the defend-
ant's argument that there were five hundred related lawsuits
89. Id. at 493, 738 P.2d at 1246.
90. Id.
91. 704 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Mont. 1989).
92. Id. at 1021-23.
93. Id. at 1023.
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989).
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pending against it nationwide.98 The Kociemba defendant did
not argue that awarding multiple punitive damages was un-
constitutional, but instead argued that repetitive punitive
damage liability would force it out of business and thereby
preclude recovery of compensatory damages by future plain-
tiffs."9 Although the court rejected this argument, it had
"grave reservations about the punitive damage award's poten-
tial effects on future plaintiffs.' ' 100 The court acknowledged
that the Minnesota Legislature's purported resolution of this
problem 0 1 was inadequate. 10 2 The Kociemba court, like the
court in Juzwin, strongly urged that the method in which pu-
nitive damages are awarded in mass toxic tort suits be revised
by Congress.103 The court suggested that courts be empowered
to reduce or eliminate punitive damage awards based on the
existence of other punitive damage claims against the defend-
ants, even though those claims were not presented as evidence
to the jury.10 4
The court in Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines0 5 held that
multiple punitive damage awards could be assessed against
the defendants, asbestos manufacturers and distributors, de-
spite numerous punitive damage claims pending."0 6 The court
rejected the defendants' argument that multiple punitive
damages would bankrupt them and stressed the deterrent
objectives punitive damages accomplish.10 7 The court added
that it would be unfair to allow the first plaintiff in a mass
toxic tort litigation to recover punitive damages but then to
98. Id. at 1538.
99. Id. at 1537.
100. Id. at 1538 n.22.
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 subd. 3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) permits a de-
fendant to present evidence to the jury of total potential punitive damage liability,
and therefore the jury will consider future liability in determining the award. The
court called this approach "flawed" because defendants are reluctant to admit evi-
dence of other lawsuits out of fear that the information would prejudice the jury into
imposing liability. 707 F. Supp. at 1538 n.22.
102. 707 F. Supp. at 1538 n.22.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
106. Id. at 376-78.
107. Id. at 376.
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deny punitive damages to all subsequent plaintiffs.10 8
One of the assumptions made by the Neal court was that
the defendants' conduct in failing to warn of the known dan-
gers of asbestos was separate and distinct with respect to each
plaintiff.109 This assumption permitted the court to reject the
defendants' argument that multiple punitive damages would
be onerous.110 The court held that "[tihe twin goals of punish-
ment and deterrence are served by separate awards of puni-
tive damages because of a jury's finding that the tortfeasor
engaged in 'outrageous conduct' with respect to each individ-
ual plaintiff." ' However, the Third Circuit subsequently
ruled that the repeated decisions by a manufacturer to sup-
press the known dangers of its product was a single wrong,
despite spanning several decades.11 2 This holding by the Third
Circuit was used by the Juzwin court to find that due process
requires a limit on the number of times a defendant could be
punished for the same act."
Much of the analysis used by the Juzwin court to reach
its conclusion was comparable to that used in Leonen v.
Johns-Manville Corp.114 In Leonen, another judge in the
same district in which Juzwin was decided held that there
was no constitutional protection from multiple assessments of
punitive damages for a single wrong.115 Leonen involved facts
similar to Juzwin and was decided after the Juzwin court had
determined a due process violation, but before it vacated its
order and allowed the plaintiff to recover punitive damages.
In Leonen, the court acknowledged that due process requires
some limits to be placed on the amount of punitive damages
which can be assessed against a manufacturer. 16 However, the
108. Id. at 376-77.
109. Id. at 390.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. School Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec (In re School Asbestos
Litigation), 789 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986).
113. Juzwin 1, 705 F. Supp. at 1056, 1062-4.
114. 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. 1989).
115. Id. at 288.
116. Id. at 283.
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court rejected Juzwin's "easy solution"' 17 of having the first
litigant who wins punitive damages preclude all others.11 8 The
court characterized such a rule as producing a "harsh and in-
equitable result." 9 Furthermore, the court called the ap-
proach taken in the first Juzwin decision "impracticable as
well as arbitrary"' 2' because it assumed that the first jury to
award punitive damages will base its figure on the overall
harm caused to all present and potential plaintiffs.'12 In New
Jersey state courts, as well as federal courts sitting in diver-
sity, a jury's award of punitive damages must be based on the
plaintiff's actual injury. 2 ' Even if the "actual injury" stan-
dard was disregarded and the award was based on the overall
harm, the Leonen court questioned whether the first plaintiff
should be entitled to a punitive damage award that is based
on a harm greater than that which he suffered. 123
In reversing its earlier order, the Juzwin court did not
address the criticisms raised by the court in Leonen. The
court's decision was not based on the "correctness" of its ear-
lier rule, but rather on the difficulty in effectuating it. If the
earlier order had stood, it would only protect defendants sued
in New Jersey. If an asbestos manufacturer was assessed puni-
tive damages in New Jersey, the earlier decision could not
have prevented another plaintiff from seeking punitive dam-
ages in another jurisdiction because of the jurisdictional limits
of the Juzwin order.
V. Proposed Legislation
A common element running among the Juzwin opinions
was the courts' recommendation that national legislation be
enacted to regulate multiple punitive damage liability in the
toxic tort context. The effectiveness of such legislation not-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Levinson v. Prentice-Hall, 868 F.2d 558, 564-65 (3d Cir. 1989); Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 673, 512 A.2d 466, 482 (1986).
123. Leonen, 717 F. Supp. at 284.
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withstanding, its enactment would be difficult. Any proposal
to restrict or to remove the right of injured plaintiffs to sue in
the courts for punitive damages would likely be met with
strong opposition. The nation's trial bar as well as organized
labor, two effective lobbying groups, are traditionally opposed
to attempts to limit the right to sue. 2" Furthermore, employ-
ers, immune from tort liability under workers compensation
laws, disfavor federal compensation plans that would likely
shift asbestos liability from manufacturers to employers using
asbestos. 25
Proposals similar to those suggested in Juzwin have not
fared well in Congress in the past. 26 Although a recent con-
gressional proposal, H.R. 1115,17 might help some manufac-
turers exposed to multiple punitive damage claims,'128 a num-
ber of provisions of the bill, as introduced, effectively exclude
many, if not most toxic tort actions from coverage. 29 Mean-
ingful state action is unlikely because in order to completely
protect a defendant's due process rights, all fifty states would
have to enact virtually identical legislation. Absent simultane-
ous enactment, those states passing such laws would deprive
their citizens of the opportunity to receive punitive damage
awards while this opportunity would exist in states that did
124. Lauder, Footing the Bill for Toxic Torts, Nat'l L. J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 40,
col. 2.
125. Id.
126. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 57 (1983).
127. The Uniform Product Safety Act of 1988, H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988).
128. The Uniform Product Safety Act of 1988 and Toxic Tort Product Liability
Actions, 3 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 406, 407 (Aug. 24, 1988) [hereinafter, Product Lia-
bility Actions]. See also 1 M. S. MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.3 (2d ed. Supp.
1991) (subsection 207 (c)(6) of the bill requires triers of fact to consider past awards
in assessing punitive damages).
129. Product Liability Actions, supra note 128. Several provisions of the act
limit its applicability to toxic torts. Section 202(c)(7) states that the bill does not
preempt state law causes of action to abate and recover damages for "pollution of the
environment." Section 202(e) excludes "any product liability action . . . for harm
caused by asbestos or asbestos products" from the bill's coverage. Section 214 (6)(B)
removes "industrial waste" and "pollutants" from the definition of "product" and
thus from the bill's reforms. Id.
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not enact similar provisions.130
VI. Conclusion
Realizing that, in the context of modern mass toxic torts,
the original order would accomplish little more than imposing
an unfair burden on an injured party, the Juzwin court's va-
cating its original order was proper. The Juzwin rulings
demonstrate the present judicial debate over the purpose and
effect that punitive damages should play in the modern realm
of mass toxic tort litigation. The decision is significant in that
it recognized a constitutional protection from multiple assess-
ments of punitive damages, but nonetheless joined a series of
recent decisions that have permitted them. The court's initial
denial of multiple punitive damage claims for the same wrong
was based on a belief that due process should limit the
amount of civil punishment a court may impose on a defend-
ant regardless of the scope or severity of that defendant's
wrongful conduct. The denial of the punitive damage claim in
this case would have had a chilling effect on future asbestos
plaintiffs' opportunities to have access to court-awarded com-
pensation. Although unlimited repetitive punitive damage lia-
bility might in fact result in overkill, the Juzwin decision does
not insist that the amount of punitive damages be unlimited,
only that the availability of punitive damages exist for all
those injured by a toxic tort.
The problems encountered in Juzwin cry out for congres-
sional action. Absent national legislation, few states or circuit
courts would be willing to acknowledge a denial of due pro-
cess, without possessing the power to enforce such a conclu-
sion. With or without legislation, multiple claims for punitive
damages based on a single wrong in toxic tort litigation are
likely to continue to increase with the further development of
products which may have dangerous effects on an unassuming
public.
130. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 666-67, 512 A.2d 466,
478-79 (1986).
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